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Robert Lawson and Irene Shipe,
Appellants
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 09-00719/00720)
Honorable R. Barclay Surrick, District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2010
BEFORE:  AMBRO, FISHER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 23, 2010)
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
2This matter comes on before this Court on appeals of Irene Shipe and Robert
Lawson from an order dated February 16, 2010, and entered February 17, 2010,
accompanying the District Court’s comprehensive opinion dated February 16, 2010,
granting a motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee, Haverford Township, in
these Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951 et seq. (West 1991), cases. 
The District Court had jurisdiction  under 29 U.S.C. § 626 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review of
the order of the District Court, and thus can affirm only if there is no dispute of material
fact and Haverford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2); Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).  In
making our review, we recognize that even though many of the facts in these cases are
germane to both appellants’ appeals, their claims are separate and thus it would be
possible for us to reach different results on the appeals.
We see no need to set forth the background of the cases at length because the
District Court did so in its comprehensive opinion.  We observe, however, that the Court
decided the cases applying the burden shifting analysis that the Supreme Court set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), rejecting
Haverford’s argument that Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009),
required the application of a somewhat different and more onerous approach for
appellants to meet in these age discrimination cases.  We see no need to consider this
3point, as the parties have briefed the cases on this appeal under the principles of
McDonnell Douglas and thus we consider the cases on that basis.  We also note that, as
the District Court observed, there is no difference in the analysis of their claims under
federal and state law.  See Conners v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 972 (3d Cir.
1998).
Though appellants undoubtedly demonstrated in the District Court that they had
established prima facie cases of age discrimination, it is equally clear that Haverford
proffered  legitimate reasons for their termination, i.e., a budget shortfall coupled with
Haverford’s belief that if appellants’ positions were eliminated other Haverford
employees could take over their duties.  Consequently, the burden passed to appellants to
offer evidence that Haverford’s assertion that it terminated their employment for
legitimate reasons actually was a pretext for discrimination.
Appellants simply did not meet that burden by presenting sufficient facts to require
or permit the District Court to submit the issue to the jury.  In this regard, after examining
the parties’ briefs, we have little to add to the Court’s opinion.  We merely note that even
assuming that Haverford could have solved its financial problems without terminating
appellants’ employment, its obviously reasonable determination of how to address its
problems should not be subject to second guessing by courts and juries.  As we indicated
in Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1082, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992), “[t]he
ADEA must not be permitted to become a mechanism to inhibit ordinary managerial
decisions” and “the ADEA is a discrimination statute and is not intended to handcuff the
4management and owners of businesses to the status quo.”  Though Gray was not a public
employment case, its principles are applicable here.
For the foregoing reason the order for summary judgment entered on February 17,
2010, will be affirmed.
